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5 October 1955


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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 29
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 15 JAN 1980 REVIEWER: 

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Dept. review completed

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CONTENTS

1. USSR WILL SEND DELEGATION TO LIBERIA (page 3).
2. RECTO REPORTED IN CONTROL OF PHILIPPINE
OPPOSITION PARTY (page 4).
3. COMMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTIONS (page 5).
4. IRAN REPORTEDLY TO DELAY IN JOINING BAGHDAD
PACT (page 6).

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1. USSR WILL SEND DELEGATION TO LIBERIA

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President Tubman told the American ambassador on 1 October that the USSR will be represented at Liberia's presidential inauguration next January by a three-man delegation headed by A. P. Volkov, chairman of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet.

Comment

The decision to send such a delegation to Liberia is another manifestation of increased Soviet interest in the Asian-African countries and follows recent Soviet moves of this type such as Pravda editor Shepilov's visit to Egypt and proposed trips by Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Afghanistan, and Egypt. Volkov has headed Soviet parliamentary delegations to Finland and Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Union has not previously shown interest in Liberia and maintains neither diplomatic nor consular representation. There is no Communist organization in Liberia or any important known subversive activity.

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2. RECTO REPORTED IN CONTROL OF PHILIPPINE OPPOSITION PARTY

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Senator Claro Recto--who was recently ousted from President Mag-saysay's Nacionalista Party--is rapidly assuming control over the

opposition Liberal Party campaign,

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In his position as a senatorial candidate on the Liberal Party ticket, Recto is allegedly bringing the party strong financial support. The Liberals are increasingly optimistic over their prospects in the 8 November senatorial election and over their chances of returning to power in 1957 with Recto as their presidential candidate.

Comment

In the coming election, nine of the 24 Senate seats are at stake. The Liberal senatorial ticket as a whole is stronger than that of the administration Nacionalistas, but the Liberals cannot gain control of the Senate without defections by Nacionalista incumbents.


Both Nacionalista senator José Laurel and his son, the house speaker, are openly campaigning for Recto's re-election, however, and might bring powerful support to the ultranationalistic and anti-American Recto's presidential bid in 1957.

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3. COMMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTIONS

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The National Party retained its lead on 4 October as Indonesian election returns mounted to over two thirds of the estimated total votes cast. Unofficial returns gave it 31 percent of the votes counted; the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 23; the Communist Party, 22; and the Masjumi, 17. About seven percent of the total vote is scattered among minor parties including the Socialists. The poor showing of this group, which co-operated closely with the Masjumi in the past, virtually eliminates it as a significant factor.

The first indication of exploratory thinking regarding the next government appeared in the Djakarta daily, Merdeka, which occasionally serves as a National Party mouthpiece. Merdeka suggested that the party consider resuming co-operation with the Masjumi and commented that co-operation with other religious parties, including the NU, would "not meet with difficulties."

The NU, which has shown unexpected strength in the elections, may hold the key to the orientation of the future government. Its past record includes co-operation with both National Party and Masjumi governments. [REDACTED]

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4. IRAN REPORTEDLY TO DELAY IN JOINING BAGHDAD PACT


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Iran will not adhere to the Baghdad pact for another two months.

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Comment

The government had previously assured the American embassy in Tehran that Iran would announce accession to the pact before 26 October. Additional delay beyond November is likely in view of the Shah's habitual indecision, the possibility of Majlis and public opposition, and the likelihood of increased pressure from the Soviet Union.

The Shah has stated that no conditions would be attached to any decision to join the pact. He has asked for assurances, however, that the United States "would continue to entertain sympathetically Iranian requests for military and economic assistance," which he claims will help obtain Majlis support.

Justice Minister Amini told the American embassy on 28 September that the Shah wants him to go to the United States immediately "to discuss Iran's financial and other problems." The Shah probably still hopes to bargain for increased military and economic aid while continuing to insist that Iran's eventual adherence to the pact is not contingent on it.

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